蔡英文登TIME時代雜誌封面(中英譯全文)
中英譯全文： ［雜誌封面］ She Could Lead the Only Chinese Democracy And that makes Beijing nervous 她將可能領導華人世界唯一的民主國家 這讓北京感到緊張 ［目錄頁］ Cover Story: Championing Taiwan Presidential front runner Tsai Ing-wen wants to put the island’s interests first 封面故事：壯大台灣 總統大選領先者蔡英文要將台灣利益置於優先 ［內頁大標］ ‘The Next President Of Taiwan’ That’s how Tsai Ing-wen refers to herself. But will the island’s voters agree? 台灣的下一任總統 蔡英文是這樣認為。但是這座島嶼的選民會同意嗎？ ［內文］ Emily Rauhala / 台北報導 Adam Ferguson / 攝影 Tsai Ing-wen is making breakfast. The presidential candidate cracks five eggs and lets them bubble with bacon in the pan. She stacks slices of thick, white toast. It’s a recipe adapted from British chef Jamie Oliver, but the ingredients, she can’t help but say, are pure Taiwan. The meat comes courtesy of Happy Pig, a farm near her spare but tasteful Taipei apartment, the bread from a neighborhood bakery. She offers me an orange. “Organic,” she says, in English. “And local, of course.” 蔡英文正在做早餐。這位總統候選人打了五個蛋，和著平底鍋裡面的培根一起吱吱作響， 再把一片片白色的厚片土司疊起來。料理手法學自英國名廚傑米奧利佛（Jamie Oliver） ，但是她忍不住要說，烹調食材屬於最純粹的台灣原料。培根來自「快樂豬」農場，距離 她那簡單卻有品味的公寓不遠，而麵包是從她家附近的烘培坊買來的。她遞了一顆橘子給 我，用英文跟我說：「有機的！當然也是在地的。」 This is not an average breakfast for the 58-year-old lawyer turned politician running to become Taiwan’s next President—most days she grabs a coffee and books it to the car. But it is, in many ways, oh so Tsai. The Taipei-raised, U.S.- and U.K.-educated former negotiator wrote her doctoral thesis on international trade law. As a minister, party chair and presidential candidate (she narrowly lost to two-term incumbent Ma Ying-jeou in the 2012 race), Tsai gained a reputation for being wonky—the type who likes to debate protectionism over early-morning sips of black coffee or oolong tea. 對於這位58歲、從律師轉變成政治人物的總統候選人來說，這可不是她平常吃的早餐。她 通常隨手抓一杯咖啡在車上喝。不過許多方面來說，這應該可以算是一貫的「蔡式」風格 。這位在臺北長大、在英美留學過的談判專家，博士論文寫的是國際貿易法。在她當陸委 會主委、民進黨主席、總統候選人期間（她在2012年的總統大選中以些微差距輸給了馬英 九總統），得到學院派的風評──她是那種喜歡在早上喝黑咖啡或烏龍茶時，跟你辯論保 護主義的人。 Now, as the early front runner in Taiwan’s January 2016 presidential election, her vision for the island is proudly, defiantly, Taiwan-centric. Tsai says she would maintain the political status quo across the strait with China—essentially, both Taipei and Beijing agreeing to disagree as to which represents the one, true China, leaving the question of the island’s fate to the future. But Tsai wants to put Taiwan’s economy, development and culture first. While Ma and his government have pushed for new trade and tourism pacts with Beijing—China accounts for some 40% of Taiwan’s exports—Tsai aims to lessen the island’s dependence on the mainland by building global ties and championing local brands. “Taiwan needs a new model, ” she tells TIME. 現在，身為在2016年台灣總統大選中的領先者，蔡英文的願景充滿自信又堅定地強調以台 灣為核心。蔡英文說她會維持兩岸的現狀──這指的是說臺北與北京彼此同意對於何者代 表中國保留不同的認知［註明：這是時代雜誌記者的見解］，並且把這個島嶼的命運留給 未來決定。但，蔡英文想要將台灣的經濟、發展與文化置於首位。當馬英九和他的政府推 動與中國的貿易及觀光協議時（中國占台灣出口的百分之四十），蔡英文希望加強與世界 連結、扶植台灣品牌，以降低台灣對中國的依賴。她對時代雜誌說：「台灣需要一個新模 式」。 Whether voters share her vision is a question that matters beyond Taipei. Taiwan is tiny, with a population of only 23 million, but its economy—powered by electronics, agriculture and tourism—ranks about mid-20s in the world by GDP size, with a GDP per capita about thrice that of China’s. Ceded by China ’s Qing dynasty to Japan after the 1894–95 First Sino-Japanese War, colonized by Tokyo for half a century, then seized by Nationalist forces fleeing the Communists at the end of the Chinese civil war, Taiwan has long been a pawn in a regional great game. It is a linchpin for the U.S. in East Asia alongside Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, and, most important, it’s the only real democracy in the Chinese-speaking world. “This election matters because it’s a window into democracy rooted in Chinese tradition,” says Lung Ying-tai, an author and social commentator who recently stepped down as Culture Minister. “Because of Taiwan, the world is able to envision a different China.” 台灣的選民是否同意她的願景，是一件擴及台北以外的事情。台灣的土地雖小，只有兩千 三百萬的人口，但是經濟因電子業，農業以及觀光業的支撐，以國內生產毛額來說在世界 排名第二十幾名。台灣的國內人均產值則是中國的三倍。台灣在1894-95的中日戰爭被中國 清朝割讓後，被日本殖民了半個世紀；之後在中國內戰結束時逃避共產黨的國民黨勢力給 佔領。長期以來台灣是區域競爭中的一個棋子。在美國的東亞布局中，台灣、日本、南韓 及菲律賓同為最關鍵的環節。更重要的是，台灣是在華語世界中唯一一個真正的民主國家 。甫卸任文化部長的作者與社會評論員龍應台묊﹛G「這場選舉很重要，因為它提供了一個窗口，讓外界一探以中華文化為根基的民主… …因為台灣，世界得以想像一個不一樣的中國。」 Taiwan’s politics irritate and befuddle Beijing. To the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Taiwan is the province that got away, a living, breathing, voting reminder of what could happen to China if the CCP loosens its grip on its periphery, from Tibet to Xinjiang to Hong Kong. Beijing is particularly wary of a change in government from Ma’s relatively China-friendly Kuomintang (KMT) to Tsai’s firmly China-skeptic Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). When Tsai ran for President in 2012, Beijing blasted her, without actually naming her, as a “troublemaker” and “splittist”—CCP-speak reserved for Dalai Lama–level foes. “A DPP government means uncertainty for cross-strait ties,” says Lin Gang, a Taiwan specialist at Shanghai Jiao Tong University’s School of International and Public Affairs. 台灣的政治讓北京感到惱怒又百思不解。對中國共產黨來說，台灣是一個逃走的省，也是 對中國活生生的提醒──若中國鬆懈對於香港、西藏及新疆等非核心地區的掌控時，可能 會發生的事。北京對於台灣的政權，由對中國相對友善的馬政府輪替到對中國保持疑慮的 民進黨，抱持格外戒慎的態度。蔡英文在2012年參選總統的時候，北京雖然沒有指名道姓 ，卻明顯對她大肆抨擊，說她是一個「麻煩製造者」或「分裂主義者」——在共產黨的術 語中，這些話專門達賴喇嘛這一層級的仇敵。任教於上海交通大學國際與公共關係學院的 台灣事務專家林岡說：「民進黨政府代表的是兩岸關係的不確定性。」 To the U.S., which is bound by the Taiwan Relations Act to come to the island’ s aid if it’s attacked, Taiwan is a longtime friend and unofficial ally, though the strength of that friendship is being tested by China’s rise. Washington worries that Taiwan’s people, especially its youth, are growing war ier of China, and that any conflict between the two might draw in the U.S. “What this election has done is crystallize the changes, the shift in public opinion,” says Shelley Rigger, a Taiwan scholar at Davidson College in North Carolina and the author of Why Taiwan Matters. “I don’t think cross-strait relations are going to be easy going forward, and that’s not something U.S. policymakers want to hear.” 對美國來說，根據《台灣關係法》，在台灣受到武力攻擊的情況下，須協防台灣。台灣是 美國長期友邦和非正式盟國，儘管兩國之間友誼的強度正受到中國崛起的考驗。華府擔心 台灣人民，特別是年輕人，對於中國的警戒心逐漸提高，而兩者之間的衝突可能會把美國 牽扯進來。著有《台灣為何重要》（Why Taiwan Matters）一書的美國北卡羅來那州戴維 森大學（Davidson College）教授任雪麗（Shelley Rigger）說：「這場選舉讓所有的改 變具體化，反映出民意板塊的移動……我不認為接下來的兩岸關係會更融洽，而這不是美 國的政策制定者想要聽到的東西。」 The KMT has yet to formally nominate a candidate for the top job, but the favorite is Hung Hsiu-chu, the legislature’s female deputy speaker. Nicknamed “little hot pepper” because of her diminutive stature and feisty manner, Hung, 67, would be a contrast to the more professorial Tsai should she get the KMT’s nod. “I don’t think [Tsai] is a strong opponent,” Hung tells TIME. Yet the DPP’s choice, who has already started pressing the flesh islandwide, is spirited too. “People have this vision of me as a conservative person, but I’m actually quite adventurous,” she says. And possessed of a sharp sense of humor—when I compliment her cooking, Tsai looks at me with mock exasperation: “I have a Ph.D., you know.” 國民黨雖然還未正式提名總統候選人，但目前最被看好的就是立法院副院長洪秀柱。因為 身材嬌小與好戰性格而被封為「小辣椒」的洪秀柱（67歲），如果獲黨的提名，將與擁有 學者形象的蔡英文，呈現顯著的對比。洪秀柱向時代記者表示：「我不認為蔡英文是一位 強的對手」。然而，民進黨的候選人已經士氣高昂，在全台各地展開競選活動。蔡英文說 ：「有些人認為我是一個保守的人，但我其實是很愛冒險的」。她有一種犀利的幽默感─ ─當我讚美她的廚藝時，她用搞笑的語氣假裝惱怒說：「我可是擁有博士學位的。」 Tsai grew up in a home on Taipei’s Zhongshan Road North, a street named after Taiwan’s symbolic father, Sun Yat-sen, the Chinese revolutionary who helped overthrow the Qing and co-founded the KMT. Her own father, an auto mechanic turned property developer, was of the Confucian kind: he encouraged her to study hard but also expected her, as the youngest daughter, to devote herself to his care. “I was not considered a kid that would be successful in my career,” says Tsai. 蔡英文在台北的中山北路長大，這條街是以革命推翻清朝、成立國民黨並視為國父的孫逸 仙命名。她的父親是一位修車技師，後來成為土地開發商。他承襲了儒家思想，希望蔡英 文要用功讀書，但也期許身為小女兒的蔡英文可以留在父親身邊照顧他。蔡英文說：「我 小時候不是一個被認為未來會有成就的孩子。」 After attending university in Taiwan, she studied law at Cornell in New York because, she says, it seemed the place for a young woman who “wanted to have a revolutionary life.” From there she went to the London School of Economics, where she earned her Ph.D., also in law, in less than three years. “That pleased my father,” she says. When he called her home, she obliged, returning to Taiwan to teach and, in 1994, to enter government in a series of high- profile but mostly policy-oriented roles in the Fair Trade Commission, National Security Council and Mainland Affairs Council. 在台灣大學畢業後，她前往紐約州康乃爾大學研讀法律，因為她說，這是一個「想過革命 性的生活」的年輕女子該去的地方。之後，她前往倫敦政治經濟學院攻讀法學博士，並且 三年不到就獲得學位。她說：「這讓我父親很高興」。她遵從父親的意思返回台灣，先回 大學教書並在1994年進入政府，出任公平交易委員會、國安會及陸委會等一系列重要的、 政策導向的職位。 Even close supporters say Tsai was, and perhaps still is, an unlikely politician, especially for the DPP. Taiwan’s opposition party was forged in struggle and led by veterans of the democracy movement—a fight Tsai mostly missed. The Kaohsiung Incident in 1979—a human-rights rally that was violently broken up by security forces, galvanizing the democracy movement— took place while Tsai was overseas, cocooned in the ivory tower. If the archetypal DPP operative is a bare-knuckle street fighter, Tsai is an Olympic fencer—restrained and precise. 就連許多親近蔡英文的支持者都認為，蔡英文是一位非典型的政治人物，特別就民進黨而 言。身為在野黨的民進黨，在台灣民主運動的奮鬥過程中焠煉而成，由民主運動的老兵所 成立，這是一場蔡英文錯過的戰役。1979年高雄的美麗島事件，當一場人權遊行遭警政單 位暴力驅散，而後來激勵了台灣的民主運動，蔡英文當時正在國外求學，受到象牙塔的庇 護。若說民進黨的典型人物是赤手空拳的街頭鬥士，蔡英文則是一位奧林匹克級的劍術家 ：自我克制又精確到位。 She stepped into the spotlight in 2008, becoming party chair when the DPP found itself booted from office, with its chief Chen Shui-bian, the outgoing President, later convicted of corruption. While she possessed a deep knowledge of policy, Tsai did not then seem like a leader. “She used to sort of hide behind me when we went door to door,” recalls legislator Hsiao Bi-khim, a longtime colleague and friend. “People compared her to a lost bunny in the forest, with wolves surrounding, both from within the party and outside. 在2008年民進黨失去政權，而前總統陳水扁隨即遭貪汙罪起訴的時刻，蔡英文踏入了鎂光 燈下，成為民進黨主席。雖然蔡英文對於政策擁有深度的瞭解，但當時她還不像一位領導 人。長期以來是她同事與朋友的立法委員蕭美琴說「以前當我們挨家挨戶去拜訪時，她有 點會躲在我身後」。「有些形容她為一個在森林裡迷路的兔子，被黨內與黨外的狼群包圍 。」 After an unsuccessful 2010 mayoral bid, Tsai ran for, and also lost, the presidency in 2012. Jason Liu, a veteran DPP speechwriter, says now that the campaign did not “sell” Tsai well enough. The ideas were strong, but the delivery left “distance between her and the voters.” Ironically, it was not until her concession speech that Tsai seemed to connect emotionally with Taiwan’s citizens. “You may cry,” she told the tearful crowd. “But don’t lose heart.” 2010年，蔡英文參與市長選舉失利，在2012年也沒順利當選總統。民進黨資深文膽劉建忻 表示，當時的競選總部對於「行銷」蔡英文這個概念，做得不夠好；雖然擁有許多好點子 ，但是執行上還是「讓選民感到有所距離」。諷刺地，一直到敗選感言，蔡英文才似乎與 台灣人民產生情感上的連結。她對含著淚水的群眾表示：「你可以哭泣，但不能洩氣。」 A lot has changed since 2012. Eleven hours after making eggs, with a policy meeting, a cross-country train ride and a harbor tour behind her, Tsai is addressing a couple hundred students at a university in the southern city of Kaohsiung, a DPP stronghold. She’s in lecture mode, at ease, talking about her party’s economic plans: stronger regional links and a focus on innovation to support small businesses. “How many of you went to Taipei for the Sunflower protests?” she asks in Mandarin. At least a third raise their hands. 2012年之後的台灣，歷經了許多改變。蔡英文煎蛋後的11個小時後，歷經了一場政策會議 、搭乘高鐵從北一路向南、緊接著進行高雄碼頭導覽。她抵達南台灣民進黨的重鎮高雄， 向數百位大學生發表演說。她以一派輕鬆的授課模式，闡述著民進黨的經濟計畫：加強區 域間的連結，並聚焦於支持創新的小型經濟。她用中文詢問在場學生「你們之中有多少人 去台北參加過太陽花學運？」現場至少有三分之一的學生舉起了手。 Taiwan’s students were once seen as apathetic. But during spring last year, Taipei was swept up by thousands-strong demonstrations over a services pact with China. Student and civic groups worried that the deal could hurt Taiwan’s economy and leave it vulnerable to pressure from Beijing. They felt it was pushed through without adequate public scrutiny. The Sunflower Movement, as it came to be called after a florist donated bundles of the blooms, grew into a grassroots revolt, culminating in the March 18 storming of the legislature. 台灣的學生過去一度被視為相當冷漠。但是在去年的春天，台北市被數以千計的抗議者淹 沒，反對與中國簽訂的服務貿易協議。學生與公民團體擔憂這個協議會傷害台灣經濟，讓 台灣的經濟受制於中國壓力而變得脆弱。他們也認為，服貿協議的推動並沒有經過適當的 公民審議。太陽花運動是民間累積的抗爭與不滿，在3月18日這天一舉衝進立法院，運動 的稱號是由於抗爭期間一位花販捐贈了大量太陽花而因此命名。 The movement was grounded in questions of social justice. Since coming to power in 2008, Ma has argued that cross-strait commerce is the key to the island’s fortunes, signing 21 trade deals. Yet young people in particular wonder if the deals benefit only Big Business on both sides of the strait. They say rapprochement with Beijing has left them none the richer, and agonize over the high cost of housing, flat wages and the possibility of local jobs going to China. A sign during a protest outside the Presidential Palace on March 30 last year captured the mood: “We don’t have another Taiwan to sell. ” 這個運動的主要訴求就是社會正義。自從國民黨2008年執政以來，簽訂了21個兩岸貿易協 定，馬英九主張兩岸的商業往來是台灣最關鍵的財富來源。但是年輕人質疑這項論述，他 們認為這些貿易協議只有兩岸的大財團獲利。他們說北京的和解政策並沒有讓年輕人變得 富有，反而讓他們受困於高房價、停滯的薪資、以及在地工作機會可能流失到中國的可能 性。在去年3月30日於總統府外的抗議中，有個標語最能捕捉整體的社會氛圍：「台灣只 有一個，賣了就沒了！」 The emphasis on quality of life, and not just macro-indicators, is good news for Tsai. Her vision for a more economically independent Taiwan did not sway the electorate in 2012 but may now have stronger appeal. The KMT, bruised by the Sunflower protests and then battered by fed-up voters in midterm polls last fall, is trying to remake itself as a more populist party. Timothy Yang, a former Foreign Minister who is now vice president of the National Policy Foundation, the KMT’s think tank, says the party stands by its cross-strait record. But even Yang, a KMT stalwart, is keen to address the issue of equity: “The benefits of this interaction with mainland China should be shared with the general public.” 台灣社會對於生活品質的重視，而非僅僅強調宏觀經濟指標，對蔡英文來說是件好事。她 希望打造一個經濟上更加獨立的台灣，雖然這個理念在2012年並沒有說動選民，但，現在 可能更有吸引力。國民黨在太陽花運動中受到重創，在去年秋天的期中選舉中又再度被選 民以選票教訓。現在，國民黨試圖把自己再造成一個民粹的政黨。目前擔任國民黨智庫『 國家政策基金會』副董事長的前外交部長楊進添先生受訪時說道，「國民黨堅持其兩岸的 立場」。但即便像楊進添這樣堅定的國民黨員，也熱衷於解決公平的議題。他說：「兩岸 互動的利益，應該要與全民共享！」 Tsai should easily carry traditional DPP support: much of the south, the youth vote, and those who identify as Taiwanese and who are not a part of the elite that came from China after the CCP victory in 1949. The DPP’s missing link is Big Business, which supports the KMT and closer ties with the mainland, where many Taiwan companies are invested. Tsai recognizes that this is a constituency she needs to woo but doesn’t seem clear as to how, beyond saying, “Our challenge is to produce something that is sensible to both sides without being considered as a traitor to the friends we used to be with when we were an opposition party.” 蔡英文要得到傳統民進黨的支持並不難，例如南部選民、年輕選票、還有那些認同自己是 台灣人，而不是1949年中國共產黨勝利後來自中國的精英份子。然而，民進黨缺乏與大企 業的連結，因為台灣企業大量投資大陸，而其中這些大財團多半支持國民黨，以及與大陸 建立更緊密的關係。蔡英文也理解到這是她必須要去吸引的一群選民，但是對於如何進行 並沒有太清楚的圖像。她說：「我們的挑戰是要去創造雙方都認為合理的立場，又不能被 我們在野時的朋友認為是叛徒。」 That will be hard. The KMT has long argued that it, not the DPP, is best qualified to run the economy, which, corruption apart, did not do well under Chen. Tsai’s supporters concede that many citizens feel the same way—that the DPP can be an effective opposition but not administration. “The KMT has always portrayed itself as more suited to guide the economy,” says J. Michael Cole, a Taipei-based senior fellow with the University of Nottingham’s China Policy Institute and a senior officer at Tsai’s Thinking Taiwan Foundation. “There’s this stubborn perception that a DPP government would be bad for business.” 這是困難的挑戰。國民黨長期主張自己比民進黨更擅長治理經濟，尤其陳水扁執政時期除 了貪污，經濟表現並不好。蔡英文的支持者也同意，確實有些民眾認為民進黨可是一個稱 職的反對黨，但不是執政黨。諾丁漢大學中國政策研究中心資深研究員暨小英基金會資深 主管寇謐將（J. Michael Cole）說：「國民黨把自己描繪是一個更適合主導經濟的政黨。 另外也有一種僵化的刻版印象，認為民進黨執政對企業不利。」 It’s a narrative that the CCP backs and may well float as the campaign progresses, either directly, in China’s state-controlled press, or indirectly, through, for instance, its connections in Taiwan’s business community. “Beijing is going to want to make a point through all sorts of channels, including Big Business, that cross-strait relations will not be as smooth if you vote a government into power that has not accepted the foundation that has underpinned developments of the last eight years,” says Alan Romberg, a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center, a Washington, D.C., think tank. 這種論調受到中國共產黨的支持，並且今隨著選戰的進展不斷被拋出。共產黨可能直接地 利用中國控制的媒體影響選舉，或是間接地透過中國與台灣商業界的連結。美國華府智庫 史汀森研究中心（Stimson Center）資深學者容安瀾（Alan Romberg）說：「北京將會透 過大企業等各種管道來闡述其立場，表明要是台灣人民讓一個不接受過去八年兩岸發展基 礎的政府執政，兩岸關係的發展將不會如現在一樣平順。」 Beijing has never been receptive to a DPP government, but it is particularly negative now. Since coming to power in 2012, China’s leader Xi Jinping has proved himself to be more assertive and nationalistic than most expected, a man not eager to compromise. Last September he told a delegation from the island that China and Taiwan might be one day be reunited under Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” formula, which is rejected by both the KMT and DPP and, surveys consistently show, the vast majority of Taiwan’s people. This May, Xi warned again about the danger of “separatist forces”—a comment widely interpreted as a swipe at the DPP. 北京對於民進黨政權的接受度向來不高，但現在尤其抱持負面的態度。中國領導人習近平 在2012年掌權後，證明自己比外界想像的還更加武斷，帶有更強烈的民族主義色彩，是一 個不輕易妥協的人。去年九月，他對一個來自台灣的代表團說，中國和台灣可望採用香港 「一國兩制」的模式統一，然而這卻是一個國民黨和民進黨都反對的方案，而且民調也一 再顯示，絕大多數的台灣人民無法接受。今年五月，習近平再度警告「分裂主義勢力」會 帶來的危險──這段說詞普遍被外界詮釋為對民進黨的抨擊。 Cross-strait relations are managed according to the so-called 1992 Consensus reached by Beijing and Taipei (then also governed by the KMT), a formula the KMT’s Yang calls “a masterpiece of ambiguity.” Under the 1992 Consensus, both sides acknowledge that there is only one China, but without specifying what exactly that means. This, Yang says, has allowed the KMT to move forward on bilateral trade, transport and tourism without being forced to address whether “one China” is the China imagined by Beijing or by Taipei. 兩岸關係是治理目前根據北京和台北（當時為國民黨執政）之間所謂的九二共識，這是一 個被國民黨的楊進添形容為「模糊性的一大鉅作」的政策。根據九二共識，雙方承認只有 一個中國，但不表明一個中國的確切意含。楊進添說，這讓國民黨在推展雙邊貿易、交通 和觀光方面得以取得進展，而不需被迫去回答「一個中國」究竟是北京或是台北心目中的 中國。 The DPP has long promoted de jure independence. The first clause in its charter calls for “the establishment of an independent sovereignty known as the Republic of Taiwan,” not the Republic of China, Taiwan’s official name. This platform resonates with the DPP base but is increasingly untenable given China’s economic clout and growing power on the world stage. While the first DPP presidency under Chen was hardly a break from the past, it did see a cooling with Beijing. Things warmed again under Ma. Lin, the Taiwan expert at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, says Tsai is somewhere between Chen and Ma: “If she wins the election, she will not pursue Taiwan in dependence. But she will not promote the development of the cross-strait relationship as Ma Ying-jeou did.” 民進黨過去長期以來推動台灣的法理獨立。民進黨黨綱第一條闡明「建立主權獨立自主的 台灣共和國」，而非台灣的正式國號中華民國。這個立場獲得民進黨基本盤的認同，卻在 中國的經濟實力成長與中國在世界舞台上崛起之下，越來越無法實現。儘管陳水扁主政時 期的民進黨政府跟過去的政策並無太大差別，但跟北京的關係確實趨向冷淡。馬英九主政 時期兩岸關係再度暖化。上海交通大學的台灣專家林岡說，蔡英文的立場介於馬英九和陳 水扁之間。他說：「如果她勝選，她不會追求台灣獨立。但她也不會像馬英九一樣推動兩 岸關係的發展。」 Tsai stresses that she will not alter the politics between Taiwan and China, but she is vague about whether she will repeal the DPP’s independence clause. And unification? That, she says, “is something you have to resolve democratically—it is a decision to be made by the people here.” 蔡英文強調她不會改變台灣和中國之間的政治關係，但對於是否撤回台獨條文卻是依然維 持模糊。至於統一呢？她說：「那是必須經由民主程序解決的事情——這是一個必須經由 此地的人民來做的決定。」 Hung, Tsai’s potential KMT opponent, says the DPP flag bearer needs to clarify her stance on cross-strait relations. “People ask her, ‘What is the status quo?’ and she can’t say anything specific,” says Hung. The KMT’s Yang offers a metaphor: “Before you harvest, you have to plow the land, transplant the seedlings, fertilize; all the work … has been done by the KMT, and yet they are going to harvest the crop?” 蔡英文的濳在對手洪秀柱說，民進黨的掌舵手需要清楚地闡明她對兩岸關係的立場。洪秀 柱說：「大家問她『維持現狀是什麼意思？』，她卻沒有給具體的回應。」國民黨的楊進 添用一個比喻：「在收割之前，要先耕地、播種、施肥；所有的工作……都已經被國民黨 完成了，然而他們現在卻想要收割？」 Tsai believes she will win that right. Several days before I return to my Beijing base, over Taiwan-Japanese fusion in Kaohsiung, Tsai is quietly confident that she will gain the trust of Taiwan’s voters and secure victory, whatever Beijing might think. She puts a final piece of tuna on my plate. It’ s from Pingtung County in the south, where she was born. “Go back to Beijing, ” says Tsai, “and tell them you were served by the next President of Taiwan. ” —With reporting by Zoher Abdoolcarim, Gladys Tsai and Natalie Tso/Taipei 蔡英文相信她會贏得這項權利。在我返回北京駐點的前幾天，我們在一家位於高雄的台式 日本料理小店用餐，蔡英文對於取得台灣選民的信任並贏得選戰，展現出低調的自信。當 時，她把最後一片鮪魚夾到我的盤子上。那塊鮪魚來自南方的屏東，她的出生地。「妳回 北京以後，告訴他們，」蔡英文說：「台灣的下一任總統曾經為妳服務過。」 連結出處：https://www.ptt.cc/bbs/Gossiping/M.1434665026.A.9D5.html
相關圖片
